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Abstract—A network user’s decision to start and continue
using security products is based on economic considerations.
The cost of a security compromise (e.g., worm infection) is
compared against the cost of deploying and maintaining a
sufficient level of security. These costs are not necessarily the
real ones, but rather the perceived costs, which depend on
the amount of information available to a user at each time.
Moreover, the costs (whether real or perceived) depend on the
decisions of other users, too: The probability of a user getting
infected depends on the security deployed by all the other users.
In this paper, we combine an epidemic model for malware
propagation in a network with a game theoretic model of the
users’ decisions to deploy security or not. Users can dynamically
change their decision in order to maximize their currently
perceived utility. We study the equilibrium points, and their
dependence on the speed of the learning process through which
the users learn the state of the network. We find that the faster
the learning process, the higher the total network cost.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices (cellphones, smartphones, pocket PCs, etc.)
acquire more and more capabilities in terms of both com-
putation and communication. Processors are getting faster,
memory and storage capacity increase, and as a conse-
quence applications for such devices multiply in number
and complexity. On the other hand, communication interfaces
multiply, too: Cellphones used to have only GSM protocol
implementations, but now most have also GPRS, UMTS,
Bluetooth, and of course many smartphones are WiFi en-
abled. These capabilities have made mobile devices very
popular. Their popularity combined with their capabilities
have made them an attractive target for malware [1], [2].
No user likes his device to be infected with malware; on
the other hand, installing and using security software costs
money, battery, CPU resources, and usability. Therefore,
users have to make a tradeoff between staying unprotected
(thus risking infection) and buying protection (thus incurring
protection costs). To make an informed tradeoff, the users
need to estimate the risk of infection, for which they need to
know the size of existing infections (if any). The more current
the infection information is, the better the cost optimization
that the users can do.
A mobile operator can warn users for currently ongoing
infections. Should it? How frequently? The operator wants
to reduce the total network cost, but the users want to
reduce their personal expected cost. Are these two objectives
aligned?
These questions have not been adequately addressed.
Traditionally, research has focused on modeling only the
propagation of worms, in the Internet [3], [4], [5], and also
in mobile networks [6], [7], [8], among others. Research
that goes beyond modeling propagation to model counter-
measures has not explicitly taken into account the users’
freedom to install protection or not. The decision to deploy
countermeasures was assumed to be taken unilaterally by the
operator (e.g., [9]) or, at any rate, always accepted by the
users (e.g., [10], [11]). The work most similar to ours [12]
has only modeled static decisions, where users decide once
and for all. At the same time, users are assumed to have
perfect knowledge of all relevant parameters, and also perfect
reasoning capabilities.
The main modeling novelty in the present work is the
combination of a worm propagation model with a game
theoretic process (which involves learning) that determines
users’ actions: The users maximize their perceived personal
cost through their decision to install or uninstall protection
and this decision depends on the information that the users
possess about the state of the network. That information
is given to them at some update rate from the operator.
Consequently, it is not current at all times, since the network
state changes, first, because of the propagation of the worm,
and, second, because of the decisions of other users. Also,
our users do not take into account the effect that their actions
will have on the network state, and therefore on the future
actions of other users. In that, they have limited reasoning
capabilities.
We find game theoretic equilibria, which are stable in the
sense that if a small proportion of the population changes
strategy, or if a small proportion of infected users enters the
population, then the dynamics of the system lead it back to
the stable equilibrium point. Our main finding is that the total
cost to the network increases as the update rate increases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II,
we describe the system model, the two components of
which are the epidemic worm propagation, and the game
theoretic decision making procedure. Section III presents the
results about the equilibrium points and their stability, and
Section IV concludes with some practical interpretation of
our results. More detailed derivations of the results are in
the Appendix.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
List of Variables
β contact rate per user per time unit
γ update rate (rate of learning from the monitor)
δ rate of recovery from the infection
N total number of users (N →∞)
S fraction of Susceptible users in the network
I fraction of Infected users in the network
P fraction of Protected users in the network
cI cost of infection
cP cost of protection
pSP (I) Probability that a Susceptible user switches
to Protected when learning I (see Eq. (3))
pPS(I) Probability that a Protected user switches
to Susceptible when learning I
(pPS(I) = 1− pSP (I))
² shape parameter of pSP (I)
I∗ position parameter of pSP (I),
(
I∗ = cP
cI
< 1
)
TABLE I
LIST OF VARIABLES
A. Epidemic-based Worm Propagation Model
We assume a network with N users, and the total contact
rate is βN contacts per time unit in the whole network, where
β > 0 is constant with respect to N . So, a given user makes β
contacts per time unit, and a given pair makes 2βN−1 contacts
per time unit. Each user can be at each time instant t in
one of three states: Susceptible (S), Infected (I), Protected
(P). We denote S(t), I(t), P (t) the respective percentages
(S(t) + I(t) + P (t) = 1; the time dependence will not be
explicitly given in the rest of the paper). A worm propagates
in the network, infecting susceptible users. The infection lasts
for a random amount of time, exponentially distributed with
parameter δ > 0. While being infected, a user infects other
susceptible users he contacts. After the infection is over, the
user becomes protected.
For the worm behavior described above, we use the
standard SIR model [13], which we will call SIP (P for
Protected):
d
dt
S = −2βSI (1a)
d
dt
I = 2βSI − δI (1b)
d
dt
P = δI (1c)
B. Game Theoretic Decision Making
The non-infected users (S and P) can choose whether to
remain in their current state or switch to the other state. Their
choice depends on the risk of getting infected versus the cost
of protection. The cost of protection is fixed at −cP < 0,
but the risk of getting infected depends on the infection cost
−cI < −cP < 0 and also on the percentage I of infected
users in the network. We define the total network cost to be
the quantity
C(I, P ) = cII + cPP. (2)
We encode these considerations in the following game
description. There are two player types: Type 1 is non-
infected, and Type 2 is infected. We are interested in the
viewpoint of a Type 1 player. The players are matched at
random, so the probability that a given Type 1 player will
meet a Type 2 player is equal to the percentage of the infected
users I .
The Type 1 versus Type 1 player game is:
S P
S (0, 0) (0,−cP )
P (−cP , 0) (−cP ,−cP )
and the Type 1 versus Type 2 player game is:
I
S (−cI ,−)
P (−cP ,−)
where we omit the payoffs of the Type 2 (infected) player.
If the non-infected players know the fraction I , they can
choose their best response as follows: Choose S if −cII >
−cP ⇒ I < cPcI ≡ I∗, and P otherwise.
The users need to learn the value of I . For the learning pro-
cess, we assume there is a centralized service for monitoring
the network, which knows instantly the current percentage of
infected users in the network. The users contact the service
at rate γ times per time unit, and learn the value of I .
As a consequence, the users do not know the exact value
of I at all times. More importantly, it has been observed [14,
Ch. 4] that when asked to choose between two alternatives,
behavior is random, becoming more deterministic when the
two alternatives become more distinct. In our case, “more
distinct” translates to larger utility difference. To model this
random aspect of the users’ behavior, we assume that a user
switches from S to P with probability pSP (I), and from P to
S with probability pPS(I). We set pSP (I) to be the following
piecewise linear function (see Fig. 1):
pSP (I) =

0 I < I∗ − ²2
1
² (I − I∗ + ²2 ) I∗ − ²2 < I < I∗ + ²2
1 I > I∗ + ²2
(3)
and pPS(I) = 1−pSP (I). For ²→ 0, this function becomes
a pure best response function. For ² > 0 it is a smoothed
best response. The best response and smoothed best response
dynamics are common models for the learning behavior of
game theoretic users [14, Ch. 3 and 4].
C. Learning Through Centralized Monitoring: The Complete
Model
The users learn the percentage I of infected users at rate
γ, the update rate, which leads to the following system:
d
dt
S = −2βSI − γSpSP (I) + γPpPS(I) (4a)
d
dt
I = 2βSI − δI (4b)
d
dt
P = δI + γSpSP (I)− γPpPS(I) (4c)
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Fig. 1. The probability that a Susceptible user switches to being Protected,
when learning the fraction I of Infected users in the network.
Note that one of the three equations is redundant, since
we know that S + I + P = 1 at all times. We keep the first
two, together with S+ I +P = 1, from which we substitute
P into the first one.
D. Mathematical Models
Our model (i.e., the system (4)) describes an evolutionary
game on the simplex in R3, since S+ I +P = 1 [15]. Such
games on the simplex have been intensively studied over the
last twenty years as they are very relevant for biological
and social population dynamics, e.g., replication dynamics
[15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21]. More specifically, it is
possible to study the dynamics and equilibria of our model
globally using the methods of [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20],
[21], which originated in the seminal work of Shahshahani
[15]. The methods involved include Lie-algebraic conditions,
potential games and Lyapunov functions.
It is also possible to view our model as a switching system
(see [22], [23], [24], as examples) on the simplex in R3,
where the switching controls are the probabilities, pSP (.)
and pPS(.); actually only one is needed. Then one can
formulate more general dynamic games where these controls
can depend on the past history of I(t) in various ways. Other
formulations can be also studied where the whole problem
is considered in either finite or infinite time, as a stochastic
game with switching strategies, still on the simplex in R3.
All these more general frameworks and formulations are
considered in our forthcoming paper [25].
III. RESULTS: EQUILIBRIUM POINTS AND STABILITY
Our main finding is
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Fig. 2. The vector field of the system (4) for the case δ > 2β. At the point
(S, I), an arrow parallel to ( dS
dt
, dI
dt
) is plotted. The only equilibrium point
is X0 = (1, 0). It is also stable.
Theorem 1. In the stable equilibrium points of our system,
the total network cost C(I, P ) monotonically decreases with
the update rate γ. So, the value of γ that minimizes C(I, P )
is γopt = 0.
In this section we state our findings about the equilibrium
points and their stability. The derivations are in the Appendix.
We look for equilibrium points by solving the system:
0 = −2βSI − γSpSP (I) + γPpPS(I) (5a)
0 = 2βSI − δI (5b)
1 = S + I + P (5c)
If δ > 2β, the only equilibrium point is
X0 = (S0, I0, P0) = (1, 0, 0) (6)
and it is stable. The vector field of the system (4) correspond-
ing to the condition δ > 2β is shown in Fig. 2
If δ < 2β, the point X0 is still an equilibrium point
but it is no longer stable. Now, there are two new potential
equilibrium points:
X1 = (S1, I1, P1) =
(
δ
2β
,
1− δ2β
1 + δγ
,
1− δ2β
1 + γδ
)
(7)
and
X2 = (S2, I2, P2) =
(
δ
2β
, I2, 1− δ2β − I2
)
, (8)
where I2 is the smallest solution of the equation
I2−
(
²
2
+
δ²
γ
+ 1 + I∗
)
I+²
(
1− δ
2β
)
+I∗− ²
2
= 0. (9)
IS
X0
X1
S =
δ
2β
I = I∗
I =
1−
δ
2β
1+
δ
γ
0
1
1
Fig. 3. The vector field of the system (4) for the case δ < 2β and
1− δ2β
1+ δ
γ
< I∗ − ²
2
. At the point (S, I), an arrow parallel to ( dS
dt
, dI
dt
) is
plotted. The point X1 =
(
δ
2β
,
1− δ2β
1+ δ
γ
,
1− δ2β
1+
γ
δ
)
is an equilibrium point and
it is stable. The point X0 = (1, 0) is also an equilibrium point but it is
unstable. We can see that all trajectories converge to X1, except those that
start on the axis I = 0, which converge to X0.
That is,
I2 =
1
2
(
²
2
+
δ²
γ
+ 1 + I∗−√(
²
2
+
δ²
γ
+ 1 + I∗
)2
− 4
(
²
(
1
2
− δ
2β
)
+ I∗
) .
(10)
The point X1 exists and is stable if and only if (in addition
to δ < 2β)
1− δ2β
1 + δγ
< I∗ − ²
2
. (11)
Otherwise, the point X2 exists and is stable. Figures 3 and
4 show the vector fields of the system (4) in the two cases
where X1 and X2, respectively, exist and are stable.
The stability in all cases was checked through the evalua-
tion of the Jacobian at each point. In all cases, the Jacobian
had eigenvalues with negative real part. In the case of X1
and X2, there can be an imaginary part for some values of
the parameters, so we have diminishing oscillations (spiral).
In particular, we have a spiral around X1 when β is close
enough to γ(1 + γδ )
2 − γ2 , and around X2 when ² is small
enough.
Note that the evaluation of the Jacobian proves local
stability (i.e., if the perturbation from the equilibrium point
is small enough, the system returns to it). However, the
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Fig. 4. The vector field of the system (4) for the case δ < 2β and
1− δ2β
1+ δ
γ
>
I∗ − ²
2
. At the point (S, I), an arrow parallel to ( dS
dt
, dI
dt
) is plotted. The
point X2 =
(
δ
2β
, I2, 1− δ2β − I2
)
(for the value of I2 see (10)) is a
stable equilibrium point, always within ²
2
below I∗ (see Appendix). The
point X0 = (1, 0) is also an equilibrium point but it is unstable. We can
see that all trajectories converge to X2, except those that start on the axis
I = 0, which converge to X0.
figures imply global stability, that is, the system returns to
the (unique for each combination of parameters) regardless
of the initial conditions, or the size of the perturbation away
from the equilibrium point. The only exception is when the
system starts on the I = 0 axis, in which case it converges
to the unstable point X0. We indeed investigate and establish
global stability results for this problem in [25].
We can now prove Theorem 1 (that network cost in the
equilibrium points X0, X1, X2 increases with γ) by differ-
entiating I1 and I2 with respect to γ. At the point X0, the
value I0 = 0 does not depend on γ, and so the network cost
in that case is 0 for all values of γ.
dI1
dγ
=
d
dγ
1− δ2β
1 + δγ
⇒ dI1
dγ
=
(
1− δ
2β
) δ
γ2(
1 + δγ
)2
⇒ dI1
dγ
> 0, ∀γ (12)
To find dI2dγ we differentiate (9), which I2 satisfies, with
respect to γ:
I22 −
(
²
2
+
δ²
γ
+ 1 + I∗
)
I2 + ²
(
1− δ
2β
)
+ I∗ − ²
2
= 0
⇒ 2I2 dI2
dγ
+ I2
δ²
γ2
−
(
²
2
+
δ²
γ
+ 1 + I∗
)
dI2
dγ
= 0
⇒
(
2I2 −
(
²
2
+
δ²
γ
+ 1 + I∗
))
dI2
dγ
+
δ²
γ2
I2 = 0
(13)
We know that I2 < 1 and I2 < I∗ + ²2 . So, 2I2 − ( ²2 +
δ²
γ + 1 + I
∗) is always negative. It follows that
dI2
dγ
> 0, ∀γ. (14)
From (12) and (14) we conclude that dI2dγ > 0, ∀γ.
Recalling that S1 = S2 = δ2β , we can see that the total
network cost increases with γ, proving Theorem 1:
C(I, P ) = cII + cPP
= cII + cP
(
1− δ
2β
− I
)
= (cI − cP )I + cP
(
1− δ
2β
)
⇒ dC(I, P )
dγ
= (cI − cP )dI
dγ
⇒ dC(I, P )
dγ
> 0, ∀γ (15)
IV. CONCLUSION
The users’ ability to switch from P to S, and vice versa,
leads to a sustained infection level (endemic), if δ2β < 1.
The actual fraction of the I at the equilibrium point (which
is proportional to the total network cost) increases monotoni-
cally with the update rate γ. This counterintuitive conclusion
is an instance of the price of anarchy phenomenon: The
individually rational outcome (large γ implies more current
information available to the users) is worse than the socially
optimal outcome.
The conflict between network optimality and individual
optimality creates a dilemma for the operator. Not notifying
the users might be interpreted as trying to manipulate them
into buying unnecessary protection. Acquiescing to their
demands and updating them as quickly as possible would be
both expensive in terms of, e.g., monitoring infrastructure,
and total network cost, as we have proven. Therefore, a
sensible compromise seems to be for the operator to shoulder
at least part of the protection costs, perhaps as part of the
package offered to users.
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APPENDIX
We find the equilibrium points X0, X1, X2 by solving the
system (4) in the three different regions of I specified in the
function pSP : I < I∗− ²2 , I∗− ²2 < I < I∗+ ²2 , I > I∗+ ²2 .
We then verify that the solutions are in the proper region.
For each case, we solve the respective simple system that
results:
• I > I∗ + ²2
The system becomes:
0 = −2βSI − γS (16a)
0 =
(
S − δ
2β
)
I (16b)
1 = S + I + P (16c)
The only solution is (S, I, P ) = (0, 0, 1), but this
contradicts the assumption I > I∗ + ²2 . Note that the
solution with S = δ2β leads to a negative value for I .
• I < I∗ − ²2
The system becomes:
0 = −2βSI + γ(1− S − I) (17a)
0 =
(
S − δ
2β
)
I (17b)
1 = S + I + P (17c)
This system has the solutions:
X0 = (S0, I0, P0) = (1, 0, 0) (18)
X1 = (S1, I1, P1) =
(
δ
2β
,
1− δ2β
1 + δγ
,
1− δ2β
1 + γδ
)
(19)
. The second solution, X1, is admissible if and only if
1− δ2β
1 + δγ
< I∗ − ²
2
(20)
and also
δ
2β
≤ 1. (21)
Note that if δ2β = 1, the two points coincide, so we
don’t need to study X1 separately in this case.
We now examine whether X0 and X1 are (locally) stable
equilibrium points. The Jacobian of the system of the
first two equations is
J(S, I) =
(−2βI − γ −2βS − γ
2βI 2βS − δ
)
(22)
We evaluate the Jacobian at the point X0:
J(X0) = J(0, 1) =
(−γ −2β − γ
0 2β − δ
)
(23)
The eigenvalues of J(X0) are −γ and 2β − δ. So, X0
is stable if and only if 2β < δ, in which case note that
X1 does not exist.
We evaluate the Jacobian at the point X1:
J(X1) = J
(
δ
2β
,
1− δ2β
1 + δγ
)
=
− 2β+γ1+ δγ −δ − γ
2β−δ
1+ δγ
0
 (24)
The eigenvalues of J(X1) are
a11±
√
a211+4a12a21
2 , where
aij are the elements of J(X1) (a22 = 0). Since a11 < 0,
the smallest eigenvalue is always negative. The largest
one is negative if and only if a12a21 < 0 ⇔ 2β > δ.
So X1 is stable whenever it exists.
If we evaluate the square root
√
a211 + 4a12a21 at the
point β = γ(1 + γδ )
2 − γ2 , we see that its argument can
also take negative values. Since the eigenvalues are a
continuous function of β, they will have an imaginary
part for β close to γ(1+ γδ )
2− γ2 , which means that the
trajectories spiral towards X1.
• I∗ − ²2 < I < I∗ + ²2
The system becomes:
0 = −2βSI − γS 1
²
(
I − I∗ + ²
2
)
+ γ(1− S − I)
(
1− 1
²
(
I − I∗ + ²
2
)) (25a)
0 =
(
S − δ
2β
)
I (25b)
1 = S + I + P (25c)
In the second equation the only admissible solution is
S = δ2β . For this value of S, the first equation gives the
following quadratic equation for I:
I2−
(
²
2
+
δ²
γ
+ 1 + I∗
)
I+²
(
1− δ
2β
)
+I∗− ²
2
= 0
(26)
Defining f(I) to be the quadratic form above, we see
that
f
(
I∗ − ²
2
)
= ²
(
1− δ
2β
−
(
1 +
δ
γ
)(
I∗ − ²
2
))
(27)
and
f
(
I∗ +
²
2
)
= −²δ
γ
(
I∗ +
²
2
+
γ
2β
)
. (28)
So, f(I∗ + ²2 ) is always negative, and f(I
∗ − ²2 ) is
positive if and only if (11) is not satisfied. That is, a
solution for I2 exists (and consequently the point X2
exists) if and only if X1 does not exist. The exact value
of I2 is given in (10). By evaluating f(I∗) and using
(11), we get that f(I∗) < 0, so actually I2 ∈ (I∗ −
²
2 , I
∗).
The Jacobian of the system of the first two equations is
J(S, I) =
(−2βI − γ −2βS − γ² (1 + I∗ + ²2 − 2I)
2βI 2βS − δ
)
(29)
We evaluate the Jacobian at the point X2 =
(
δ
2β , I2
)
.
J(X2) =
(−2βI2 − γ −δ − γ² (1 + I∗ + ²2 − 2I2)
2βI2 0
)
(30)
The eigenvalues of J(X2) are
α11±
√
α211+4α12α21
2 ,
where αij are the elements of J(X2) (α22 = 0). Since
α11 < 0, the smallest eigenvalue is always negative. The
largest one is negative if and only if α12α21 < 0. But
α21 > 0, and α12 = −δ− γ² (1+I∗+ ²2 −2I2), which is
always negative since I2 < 1 and I2 < I∗ + ²2 . So the
largest eigenvalue is also always negative, and therefore
X2 is stable whenever it exists.
Since lim²→0+ α12 = −∞, we can see that for small
enough values of ² the eigenvalues have an imaginary
part, which causes the trajectories to spiral towards X2.
